개정 기업결합 심사기준에 대한 검토

Abstract

개정 기업결합 심사기준은 기업결합의 경쟁제한성을 평가하는데 있어서 시장점유율에 의한 양적 평가뿐만 아니라 실질적인 경쟁제한성을 가져오는지에 대한 질적 평가기준을 구체화했다는 점에서 의의를 지닌다. 개정 기업결합 심사기준은 기업결합의 실질심사 대상을 확대하고, 경쟁제한성 판단 요소인 단독효과와 협조효과의 내용을 보완하고, 구매력 증대에 따른 효과를 반영하도록 하였으며, 경쟁제한성 상쇄요소로서 강력한 구매자의 존재를 고려하고, 신규진입 요소를 보다 구체화하였다. 본 논문에서는 개정 기업결합 심사기준의 내용을 살펴보고 미국과 EU와 비교하며 개정의 타당성 및 미비점에 대해서 논하고자 한다.

When assessing anticompetitive effects of Merger, the Revised Merger Guidelines consider not only the market share but also the several criteria which consist of M&A substantially restricting competition. The Revised Merger Guidelines specify the qualitative criteria for assessing anticompetitive effects. The Revised Merger Guidelines expand the real targets of merger review, improve the contents of unilateral effect and coordinated effect, reflect the effects of Buying Power, consider the existence of powerful buyers as the countervailing factor of anticompetitive effects and more specify the factors of new entrants. In addition, by changing the system of guideline and placing the factors alleviating anticompetitive effects in the separate chapter, the guidelines make it clear that the criteria are also applicable to vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers. In this regard, they complement a large part of the insufficiency of the existing guidelines. However, as mentioned above, there still remain unsolved problems, which are the concentration of economic power of conglomerate mergers, considering differentiated product markets, narrowly defining only the categories of customers specifically targeted for a price increase, flexibilization of market definition and considering the uniqueness of the innovation markets such as high-tech or pharmaceutical markets. Notwithstanding these flaws, the guidelines bring the significant advancements so that it can not be necessarily wrong and condemned.