Local Autonomy and Japanese Constitution - David and Goliath

Abstract

This paper argues for local government autonomy under the Japanese Constitution. Currently, the Japanese Diet (parliament) is discussing the possibility of amending the Constitution. Unlike the Constitution of South Korea, the Japanese Constitution has not been amended since its establishment in 1947.1 In Japan, political scandal has prevented active discussion in the Diet on constitutional amendments. It is not clear that parliament will propose bills to the people for ratification of constitutional amendmentsin 2018. In the meantime, some Japanese local governments are more active in responding to their citizens, while central government decision making is slow. Several examples exist oflocal governments encouraging central government decision making while parliamentary decision making was paralyzed. Local governments are sometimes able to pass local ordinances that are more advanced than the national legislation from the Diet. In Japan, the phrase “principle of local autonomy” 2 in the current Constitution is already subject to interpretation by inferior statutes, such as the Local Autonomy Act. 3 Japanese constitutional scholars have not focused on the terms of the Constitution outside of the context of the Local Autonomy Act. This paper concludes that the autonomy of local governmentsis weak because they are largely dependent on the financial resources of the central government. The struggle between the two resembles the battle between David and Goliath. In order for David to stand up to Goliath, financial autonomy should be included in a bill amending the Constitution. Lastly, this paper does not support the current administration’s bills to amend the Constitution but brings the constitutional discussion to the attention of the people. Ordinary people focus on their daily lives, not on the mid and long-term goals of the country, which amendments to the Japanese Constitution aim to achieve.